

연구논문

Collaborative Governance and Charter School Service Delivery

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〈 Abstract 〉

The article aims to empirically analyze the variation of a local charter school service delivery in the USA. For this study, the author selected school districts as the units of analysis. And, the sample is obtained from Colorado. Since Colorado voters passed its charter school law in 1993, school districts have tried to deliver charter school services to their education customers. Charter schools' spread across Colorado has been steady. Currently, these efforts of school districts make the broad variation in each school district's charter school service delivery to residents. Namely, some school districts deliver more charter school services to their education customers while other school districts do not. This study finds an answer to explain why this variation emerges in school districts, testing hypotheses made based on the contents of collaborative governance and school district characteristics. The final statistical results demonstrate that both collaborative governance and fiscal capacity factors are a primary cause making this variation in delivering charter school services to residents appear in Colorado's school districts.

[Key words: Collaborative governance, fiscal capacity, public education service]

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I . Introduction

The primary goal of this article is to examine why some school districts deliver more charter school services to their education customers and other school districts deliver them much less or not at all. A charter school is an innovative school choice movement (SCM) tool. SCM emphasizes that the traditional public school (TPS) system has limits in helping develop students' creativity and improving low students' performance due to its monopolistic tendency and command-controlled characteristic (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Hess, 2008; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Schneider et al., 2000). SCM scholars have proposed that the American TPS system needs to utilize a competitive and free market approach to improve the TPS weaknesses and accomplish its better growth.

SCM advocates' rationale is that the competitive and free market approach can positively grow the TPS system by providing their customers with better educational services through schools' competition. If schools in the TPS system are not better than other schools in a competitive circumstance, education customers such as students and parents do not choose schools that do not offer what they want to receive. Namely, schools will lose their education customers to other schools. Thus, schools will do their best for education customers in order to choose themselves. SCM advocates believe that these schools' efforts lead schools to accomplish their better growth that fits the demand and satisfaction of education customers (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Witte & Rigdon, 1993). Since the 1990s, many innovative SCM tools have been introduced and utilized to stimulate public schools in the TPS system to accomplish their better growth and improve their students' performance.

Among innovative SCM tools, a charter school is one of the most impressive SCM tools. They have steadily been spreading across the USA since Minnesota legislators passed its charter school law in 1991 (Buckley & Schneider, 2007; Renzulli & Evans, 2005). As of 2017, total 44 jurisdictions embracing Washington D. C. and 43 states have adopted their charter school laws. Currently, seven states do not possess their own charter school acts (National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 2017).¹⁾ Many

scholars (Lee, 2014; Levy, 2010; Mintrom, 2000; Renzulli & Roscigno, 2005; Wong & Langevin, 2007) have studied this charter school research topic at the state level, analyzing a binary phenomenon of charter school law per year for the policy formulation stage study. Namely, most of studies related to the charter school service research topic have generally focused on studying the state level. However, the charter school research is very rare at the local level which, in reality, operates charter schools.

For an academic contribution, the author analyzes mechanisms of charter school service delivery at the local level. The study's research question is why the variation in charter school service delivery emerges in Colorado's school districts. To empirically examine this research topic, this article analyzes six hypotheses related to collaborative governance and school district characteristics. In the public administration area, some scholars (Hall & O'Toole, 2000, 2004; Meier & O'Toole, 2003, 2005) have used several factors relevant to both collaborative governance and jurisdiction characteristics to analyze mechanisms of public service delivery. The author applies their analysis approach logic to the case of Colorado's local charter school service delivery.

This study is composed of four parts excluding introduction. The first part introduces the concept and fact of charter schools across the USA and explains the contents of Colorado's charter schools as this study's units of analysis. The second part focuses on looking at theoretical approaches related to collaborative governance and other independent variables and shows their hypotheses. The third part describes statistical techniques and presents their analyzed results. The last part proposes implications of the final results and mentions the next steps for future studies.

1) Currently, the seven states that do not have their own charter school law are as follows: North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, and West Virginia.

II. Charter Schools in the United States

The term charter school was introduced by Ray Budde and Albert Shanker in the USA in the late 1980s (Kolderie, 2005; Renzulli & Evans, 2005; Vergari, 2002, 2007). They argue that traditional public schools in the TPS system show their limits in improving better student performance and helping develop students' inborn gifts. They introduce the concept of a free and competitive market approach as a method to overcome these limits of traditional public schools. And, they propose charter schools as an innovative educational tool including the free and competitive market concept. Several scholars (Buckley & Schneider, 2007; Levy, 2010; Vergari, 2002) regard charter schools as innovative educational tools that effectively improve American student performance without decreasing the primary role of public education and public schools. The definition of charter school describes its main characteristics. Charter schools are public schools that do not charge tuitions to students. However, they possess their own curricula based on charters and rules, which are authorized by a school district, like private schools (Booker et al., 2008; Mintrom & Vergari, 1997; Renzulli, 2005; Renzulli & Roscigno, 2005). McGuinn (2003) explains that charter schools are usually established by individuals or groups who concern about the poor or bad performance of traditional public schools.

Since Budde and Shanker introduced the concept of charter schools, Minnesota became the first state that adopted charter school law in 1991 (Schneider & Buckley, 2006). And, the first charter school was established in St. Paul, MN in the next year (Logan, 2018; Wohlstetter & Anderson, 1994). As of 2017, 44 jurisdictions excluding seven states have passed their own charter school law (National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 2017). The Center for Education Reform (2019) indicates that as of the 2018-2019 academic year, there are approximately 7,000 charter schools in the USA. And, more than 3.2 million students study in these charter schools.

Regarding Colorado's charter school status quo, the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools (2017) indicates that Colorado has a strong charter school law, compared to other states. Its rankings is No. 5 among 44 jurisdictions. Colorado

legislators passed its charter school law in 1993 (Griffin, 2013). In the early 1990s, educational leaders and education demanders in Colorado tried to find new educational tools to provide their children with better educational services and reform monopolistic K-12 system's circumstance (Hirsch, 2002; Ziebarth, 2005). In 1993, Colorado legislators from both Democratic and Republican parties adopted the law necessary in establishing and operating charter schools in Colorado.

Since then, charter schools in Colorado have widely been spreading (Griffin, 2013). In the 1993-1994 school year, the Academic Charter School and the Connect School were established as the leading charter schools in the Douglas County RE-1 and Pueblo County 70 school district respectively (Griffin, 2013; Ziebarth, 2005). The Colorado League of Charter Schools (2017) indicates that as of 2017, 183 charter schools have operated across Colorado. The number of charter schools in Colorado occupies nearly 10% of the total number of Colorado's K-12 public schools. And, these charter schools offer approximately 114,000 students education services.

The school district providing the most charter schools for education customers is the Denver County 1 school district, where 36 charter schools are established and operated. The literature review for Colorado's charter schools describes that the charter school expansion in Colorado has been steady since the Colorado Charter School Act was enacted in 1993 (Griffin, 2013). This steady charter school expansion currently creates the imbalance of charter school services among Colorado's school districts. Namely, some school districts provide more charter school services for their education demanders while other school districts do not. This study empirically examines why this variation in delivering charter school services to education customers occurs in Colorado school districts. Therefore, a research question is as follows: Why does the variation in delivering charter school services to residents emerge in Colorado's school districts? The next sections are constructed to find more specific explanatory factors that can respond to this research question.

III . Explanatory Factors Influencing Charter School Services

Since Colorado legislators enacted charter school law in 1993 to provide education customers with better educational services, many Coloradans have regarded charter schools as one of the most successful educational innovations. However, the wide variation in delivering charter school services to education customers have appeared among Colorado school districts. This article aims to research why this variation in the charter school service delivery emerges among Colorado's school districts. To more specifically examine mechanisms of charter school service delivery, this article utilizes diverse contents of both collaborative governance and school district characteristics. These days, scholars who research public service delivery's mechanisms have very actively applied the concepts of collaborative governance and jurisdictions' characteristics into their studies.

1. Collaborative Governance

This study's academic trial to empirically understand the board variation of the local charter school service delivery focuses on an explanatory role of collaborative governance. Among several factors that affect the adoption and delivery of an innovative service, many scholars (Mah & Hills, 2014; Ovseiko, et al., 2014) demonstrate that the collaboration of actors—individuals, organizations, or jurisdictions—facilitates to accept an innovative service and deliver it to citizens.

The term 'collaborative governance' means inter-individual or organizational arrangements (Milward & Provan, 2000). In collaborative governance, an actor is connected with other actors. Actors cooperate with each other (Mosley & Jarpe, 2019; Robertson, 2011; Ulibarri & Scott, 2016). Namely, in the world of collaborative governance, actors are not lonely entities (deLeon & Varda, 2009). A main element of collaborative governance is networks of actors. Their roles shed lights on accounting for why actors produce better outcomes in a public service adoption and delivery. Some scholars (Getha-Taylor et al., 2019; Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004) stress that

collaborative governance improves actors' trust among them through networks. Higher levels of trust in collaborative governance lead to reduce transaction costs that appear in the adoption or delivery processes of an innovative service (Burt, 2000; Lubell et al., 2002). Moreover, actors can more easily obtain information and share it with others through networks embedded in collaborative governance (Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Granovetter, 1973, 1982).

Many scholars (Aldrich, 2008; Freeman, 2004; Granovetter, 1973, 1982; Scott, 2000) support the idea that interactions of multiple actors are pivotal factors accounting for social phenomena. The collaborative governance approach very importantly treats interactive processes among interdependent actors (Aldrich, 2008; Klijn, & Koppenjan, 2012; Koliba et al., 2017; Silvia, 2011). The fundamental perspective of the collaborative governance approach is that an actor cooperates with other actors in the open system. An actor needs to obtain resources from other actors in order to survive and develop themselves. An actor engages in cooperate relations with other actors. Networks created by interdependent actors play roles as a main factor facilitating to exchange actors' resources (Aldrich & Whetten, 1981; Meier & O'Toole, 2005; Scott, 2000).

Scholars in the public administration area have become more familiar with the term collaborative governance. Collaborative governance focuses on the patterns of close interactions among diverse actors—decision-makers, bureaucrats, consultants, researchers, etc. In collaborative governance, each actor is an entity who recognizes contents and problems of a specific issue, seeks several solutions for the issue, and shares them with other actors. Therefore, actors in collaborative governance know about contents and solutions for the specific issue through their networks (deLeon & Varda, 2009; Mintrom, 2000)

Many public administration scholars (Agranoff, 2004; Bressers & O'Toole, 1998; Howlett, 2002; Meier & O'Toole, 2001, 2003, 2005; Provan & Milward, 2001) have emphasized that collaborative governance actions of actors—individuals, organizations, and jurisdictions—facilitate the speed of public service delivery and improve its performance. They demonstrate that a public organization that

collaborates with other organizations pursuing the same goal delivers more public services to citizens than an isolated public organization does. Therefore, a collaborative governance arrangement fosters jurisdictions to deliver their innovative services to their residents.

Regarding relationships between collaborative governance and educational innovations, many scholars (Cibulka, 2001; Meier & O'Toole, 2001; Mintrom & Vergari, 1998; Torenvlied et al., 2012) demonstrate that strong collaborative governance among organizations positively influence the delivery processes of an innovative educational service. Torenvlied et al. (2012) demonstrate that the development of American education has been influenced by interdependent organizational arrangements. Cibulka (2001) also emphasizes that the development of collaborative governance expressed as networks leads the growth of several demands for public school innovations. Mintrom and Vergari (1998) empirically test if collaborative governance made among policy entrepreneurs positively influences a government action adopting a state charter school law. Their research proves that a state with stronger collaborative governance has more chances in delivering innovative services to their residents.

Among organizations working for public educational innovations or education reform, school districts are very critical entities. They are a government deciding to keep operating or to stop all education services that are offered to education customers in their territory. This role of a school district is possible because a school districts has taxing power in making its budget. However, Meier and O'Toole (2001) stress that a school district has not been effectively operated by itself in accepting and operating innovative educational services. A school district needs to collaborate with other organizations to effectively operate innovative educational services and obtain their better outcomes. Two scholars point out that a school district is embedded in collaborative organizational settings and highlight that it is basic for a school district to cooperate with other actors—state governments, private organizations, and other school districts—for effective education service delivery. Therefore, it is hypothesized that a school district that collaborates with other

organizations very well is more likely to deliver charter school services to its education customers.

2. Characteristics of School Districts

Although this article focuses on empirically analyzing the explanatory power of collaborative governance on the variation of the local charter school service delivery in Colorado, it is necessary for this study to test several factors related to school district characteristics. Berry and Berry (2007) emphasize that it is fundamental for a scholar to look at influential power of jurisdiction characteristics in researching mechanisms of dynamic innovation processes. Some scholars (Bushouse, 2011; Bundschuh-Rieseneder, 2008; Ostrom, 2007, 2011) also point out that analyzed jurisdiction characteristics are very important in analyzing innovation processes. Along with these scholar perspectives that emphasize the explanatory power of jurisdiction characteristics, this article builds up five hypotheses on the basis of some critical elements that describe each school district's characteristics well.

1) Fiscal Capacity

Public administration scholars show two contrary opinions for jurisdictions' fiscal capacity in accounting for mechanisms of an innovative tool's adoption and operation. First of all, some scholars (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Tahrima & Jaegal, 2012; Renzulli, 2005) argue that jurisdictions' good fiscal situations help jurisdictions adopt and operate innovative tools. Organizations or jurisdictions with strong fiscal capacity more easily challenge adopting and operating innovative tools. That is to say, plentiful budgets of jurisdictions drive jurisdictions to adopt innovative tools and deliver them to their residents. A fiscal capacity of a local government is a fundamental element that makes a local government try to enforce its government reform by adopting and operating an innovative tool. Mintrom and Vergari (1998) also support that states with high expenditures adopt and operate an innovative

educational tool because their strong fiscal capacity can drive themselves to explore and operate diverse innovative educational tools. That is to say, jurisdictions' strong fiscal capacity can pay the expenses incurred in adopting and operating an innovative educational tool. This means that school districts with strong fiscal capacity more actively adopt and operate an innovative educational tool. Based on this fiscal capacity logic, it is hypothesized that a school district with strong fiscal capacity is more likely to deliver charter school services to its education customers.

Contrarily, there is an opposite opinion for the aforementioned fiscal capacity hypothesis. Wong and Langevin (2007) point out that jurisdictions with weak fiscal capacity try to adopt and operate an innovative tool due to residents' requests. Generally, residents living in jurisdictions with weak fiscal capacity recognize that it is difficult for them to receive better public services from their jurisdictions. Thus, they pressure their jurisdictions to adopt and operate an innovative tool that produces high service quality through low costs. Therefore, a school district with weak fiscal capacity is more likely to adopt and operate an innovative educational tool. Based on both arguments for jurisdiction fiscal capacity, this article can make a hypothesis as follows: jurisdictions' fiscal capacity drives school districts to be more likely to deliver charter school services to their education customers.

2) Socioeconomic Status Elements

Some scholars (Schneider et al., 2000; Teske et al., 2006) indicate that it is much easier for parents with high socio-economic status to collect and know better information for what they want to receive from a government. Thus, it is usual that jurisdictions with many residents having high socio-economic status confront many public service requests from their residents (Berry & Berry, 2007). Regarding mechanisms of the educational reform movement, scholars explain that parents with higher socio-economic status obtain better resources and more qualified information about schools. Therefore, it is much easier for parents with more qualified information related to education services to ask their public educational

governments for more diverse education services for their children (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Schneider et al., 2000, Teske et al., 2006). These scholars' perspectives support that school districts with residents having high socio-economic status receive more requests for innovative educational tools from education customers. Therefore, a school district having many residents with high socio-economic status is more likely to deliver innovative educational tools to its education customers. Based on the socio-economic status perspective, two hypotheses are created as follows: 1) a school districts with many high educated residents is more likely deliver charter school services to its education customers. 2) a school district with many residents having high income is more likely to deliver charter school services to its education customers.

3) Interest Groups

Some scholars (Dur, 2019; Grossmann, 2012; Lockner, 2013; Schuck, 1977) indicate that interest groups usually are well-organized political entities that influence government's actions. And, their political participation is related to their benefits. If an innovative tool that a government adopts and operates influences their property increase, they usually prefer the adoption and operation of the innovative tool (Andlovic & Lehmann, 2014). Baumgartner and Leech (1998) introduce interest groups as any associations of collaborative entities that attempt to work together to accomplish a single shared goal. Therefore, interest groups actively lobby decision-makers and bureaucrats to adopt and operate an innovative tool that fits interest groups' benefits.

It is natural that diverse self-interested individuals or groups participate in several institutions' processes in the USA. Their various ideas and opinions help decision-makers or bureaucrats adopt and operate the best one among several institutions (Boatright, 2011). Generally, there are many interest groups involved in the adoption and operation processes of an innovative institution (Birkland, 2001; Cahn, 1995). Some scholars (Alperovitz & Speth, 2011; Gilens & Page, 2014) stress

that the concept of interest groups in the USA includes and expresses both democracy and freedom of America's spirits. About two centuries ago, Alexis de Tocqueville draws the USA as a country where interest groups can express their voices and they freely participate in government's decision processes. Tocqueville expresses the voices of interest groups as the term freedom and explains their active political participation as the term democracy. Both freedom and democracy are America's founding spirits. Namely, American interest groups have existed and kept because they are a political symbol including American founding spirits. Thus, we can express interest groups as a symbol of American freedom and democracy (Cigler & Joslyn, 2002).

Some scholars (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998; Nicholson-Crotty & Nicholson-Crotty, 2004; Teske, 1991) in the public administration academic field stress political roles of interest groups in looking at mechanisms of innovation's adoption and operation processes. They underscore that the adoption and operation of an innovative tool are strongly influenced by interest groups' agreements. Teske (1991) indicates that interest groups pressure a government to adopt and operate an innovative tool if it positively influences their benefit increase. These interest groups lead elected decision makers to consider their requests because political power of interest groups is totally related to their election results. Thus, interest groups can be regarded as political joiners who stimulate both decision-makers and implementers to adopt and operate an innovative policy tool.

Of course, interest groups exist and appear in the public education area as well. Mawhinney and Lugg (2001) point out that interest groups has steadily expanded in the public educational area since the 1970s. Some scholars (Manzzoni, 1995; Wirt & Kirst, 1997) also emphasize that diverse interest groups are involved in public education area and they actively joins in making and operating educational policies. Interest groups in the public education area include several self-interested entities such as student groups, teachers unions, parent groups, for-profit companies, governments, etc.

Regarding school choice movement (SCM) and charter schools, Chubb and Moe (1990) highlight that there are many interest groups influenced by an innovative SCM

tool. Vergari (2007) categorizes interest groups as two interest groups—pro-interest groups and anti-interest groups—for innovative SCM tools. Pro-SCM interest groups want a government to adopt and operate an innovative SCM tool, supporting a perspective that the traditional American education system must be changed to more competitive system for better education performance. However, anti-SCM interest groups argue that the monopolistic education system fits a goal accomplishing social equality and facilitating social stability rather than the competitive education system does. Based on the aforementioned logic of interest groups for the school choice movement, it is hypothesized that a school districts with many pro-SCM interest groups is more likely to deliver charter school services to its education customers.

4) Minority Population

The USA is composed of Caucasians and multiple minorities (Alba, 2018; Pollard & O'Hare, 1999). Governments in the USA must consider minorities when governments accept and operate new institutions because they might be related with the benefits or disadvantage of each minority group (McCormick, 2012). In general, the social position and social class of minorities are not high compared Caucasians' (Good & Braden, 2000; Karlsen & Nazroo, 2002; Levy, 2010). In the USA, the bottom part of the social pyramid is usually occupied by many minorities (Kraus et al., 2017; Wodtke, 2015). Minorities in the USA try to improve their social position through educational successes (Berger & Archer, 2015; Lee, 2014; Life, 2015). Education successes have usually been a way to have economic stability, fame, and power. Thus, we can assume that minorities want to receive more education services to improve their social position and to live in more stable conditions in the future.

This perspective leads one assumption that school districts with many minority residents need to provide more education services for their minority residents. Moreover, some scholars (Delaney, 2008; Friedman et al., 2006; Good & Braden, 2000) stress that minority parents are not satisfied with the traditional public school services and want governments to provide their children with better public education service

options. Stoddard and Corcoran (2007) support the aforementioned study results by proving that school districts with many African Americans offer their residents more charter school services. Based on the logic of minority population for education service requests, it is hypothesized that a school district with high minority population is more likely to deliver charter school services to its education customers.

IV. Research Design and Statistical Results

This article aims to examine under what conditions school districts deliver more charter school services to their residents. In this study, school districts are used as the units of analysis. Sample for data collection is 178 Colorado's school districts. This article utilizes six hypotheses to seek an answer to the research topic. They are made based on the contents of the collaborative governance approach and characteristics of school districts. <Table 1> describes how each independent variable is measured and what its potential direction for the dependent variable is.

<Table 1> Potential Directions of Independent Variables on Dependent Variable

Independent Variable	Estimate (Data Source)	Expected Direction
Primary Independent Variable		
Collaborative governance	* Density of networks among school districts and seven public education organizations (Survey)	positive
Characteristics of School Districts		
Fiscal capacity	* Logged expenditures per student (Colorado Department of Education)	positive or negative
Residents' educational level	* % of residents with a bachelor or higher degree in each school district (Colorado Department of Education)	positive
Residents' per capita income	* Log of average per capita income of each school district (Colorado Department of Education)	positive
Pro-SCM interest groups	* # of pro-SCM interest groups in each school district (Survey)	positive
Minority Population	* Logged number of total minority residents in each school district (Colorado Department of Education)	positive

1. Descriptive Statistics of All Variables

The dependent variable in this study is obtained from secondary data of the Colorado League of Charter Schools. The six independent variables are collected by a survey and secondary data. The survey was conducted to superintendents in Colorado's school districts and representatives in public education organizations that support Colorado's school choice movement and charter schools to obtain data estimating both collaborative governance and pro-SCM interest groups independent variables while the sources of secondary data for the remaining independent variables are mainly obtained from the Colorado Department of Education.

⟨Table 2⟩ describes the quantitative facts of all variables. As aforementioned, this study utilizes Colorado's school districts as the units of analysis. The Center for Education Reform (2017) indicates that Colorado has a strong charter school law among 44 jurisdictions (43 states and Washington, D.C.) adopting and implementing their own charter school law. In the study, the dependent variable is estimated by the number of charter schools in each Colorado school district. Its range is from 0 to 36. The dataset shows that the Denver County 1 school district among 178 Colorado school districts delivers the greatest number of 36 charter schools to its education customers.

Regarding six independent variables, the collaborative governance independent variable is measured by the degree of network density that each school district forms with seven public education organizations that work for charter schools and the school choice movement.²⁾ Many public administration scholars (Agranoff, 2007; Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Goldsmith & Kettle, 2009; Milward & Provan, 2006) have utilized social networks to measure collaborative governance. Among them, Agranoff (2007) also introduces collaborative governance as public management network

2) Through the literature review, the author finds seven public education organizations actively supporting charter schools in Colorado. They are as follows: Colorado League of Charter Schools, Colorado Charter School Institute, Colorado Children's Campaign, Education Leadership Council, Best Board, Colorado Department of Education, and Colorado Education Association.

(PMN). This means that Agranoff regards social networks as an indicator to estimate collaborative governance. Meanwhile, Scott (2000) defines social networks with the three concepts—density, centralization, and centrality as follows: 1) network density is to estimate how many connections actors in social networks construct, 2) network centralization is to estimate how well connected actors in social networks are, and 3) network centrality is estimate how influential a primary actor in social networks is to other actors. The author utilizes network density to measure the collaborative governance variable because this article focuses on knowing about if many (frequent) connections between a school district and seven public education organizations drive a school district to deliver more charter schools to its own education customers. In this study, network density indicates the degree of cohesion among each school district and the aforementioned seven public education organizations. These public education organizations give a school district positive influence because they have worked for public education reform in Colorado together. The value of network density among each school district and seven other public organizations ranges from 0.63 to 0.84.³⁾ There are two school districts having the highest score of 0.84 network density. They are Pueblo City 60 School District and Mesa County Valley School District 51. And, the Byers 32J school district receives the weakest score of 0.63 network density.

The fiscal capacity independent variable is measured by expenditures per student in each school district. Its mean is about \$4,440. The residents' educational level independent variable is estimated by the percentage of residents with a bachelor or higher degrees. The mean of this independent variable is 24.36. This means that approximately 24.4% of adults in each school district possess a bachelor's or higher degrees. The residents' economic level independent variable is measured by average per capita income of each school district. Its mean is

3) Scott (2000) obtains a value of network density by dividing # of actual links that actors in social networks create by the maximum # of links that the actors can create. And, UCINET 6 is used as a statistical program to calculate network density formed by each school district and seven public education organizations.

25,519.16. This means that residents' average income is \$25,519. The mean of the pro-SCM interest groups independent variable is 1.38. This indicates that there are about 1.4 interest groups supporting the school choice movement in each school district. Finally, the minority population independent variable shows that its mean is 8,474.19, which explains that the average number of minority population in each school district is nearly 8,474 persons.

〈Table 2〉 Descriptive Analysis of All of the Variables

Independent variables	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean
Charter schools	178	0	36	1.03
Collaborative governance	126	0.63	0.84	0.7
Fiscal capacity	178	48.8	81191.8	4443.82
Residents' educational level	178	7.3	62.2	24.36
Residents' economic level	178	13261	70665	25519.16
Pro-SCM interest groups	114	0	20	1.38
Minority population	178	17	287146	8474.19

2. Analyzed Results

To test the aforementioned hypotheses, this article utilizes the multiple OLS regression analysis as a statistical technique. Several scholars (Hair et al., 2010; Morgan et al., 2013; Remler & Van Ryzin, 2011) suggest that the multiple OLS regression is a proper statistical technique when both dependent variable and independent variables in an equational model are continuous variables. Therefore, operating multiple OLS regression analysis for this study is right because all of the variables in the final equation model are continuous variables.

The statistical results are shown in 〈Table 3〉 and 〈Table 4〉. 〈Table 3〉 describes the results of both tolerance level and variance inflation factor (VIF). Both tolerance levels and VIF play a role of confirming if there is a multicollinearity issue among six independent variables. The statistical results demonstrate that all of the independent variable do not have similar characteristics compared to other independent

variables’ characteristics by showing that the values of tolerance of all independent variables are larger than 0.1 and the values of VIF of all independent variables are smaller than 10. These analyzed results concretely confirm that statistical results obtained through the multiple OLS regression analysis can be more accurate because there are not any multicollinearity issues in the final equation model.

〈Table 3〉 Analyzed Results of Multicollinearity for Independent Variables

Independent variables	Tolerance	VIF
Collaborative governance	0.530	1.888
Fiscal capacity	0.116	8.649
Residents’ educational level	0.359	2.787
Residents’ economic level	0.385	2.596
Pro-SCM interest groups	0.774	1.293
Minority population	0.128	7.812

〈Table 4〉 shows the statistical results analyzed by the multiple OLS regression analysis, whose role is to confirm if there are relationships between the dependent variable and each independent variable when other predictor variables are held constant. The analyzed sample size in the study is 110 cases, which do not possess any missing values in each independent variable. On indicating that Chi-square of 15.904 with 0.001 of a p-value, Table 4 shows that the final equation model combining six independent variables significantly predicts the variance of the dependent variable (variation of charter school service delivery of each school district). Adjusted R^2 of 0.448 means that six independent variables account for nearly 45% of the variance in the dependent variable.

Among six independent variables, two independent variables—collaborative governance and fiscal capacity—are statistically significant at 0.1 level and 0.01 level respectively. However, the rest of the independent variables are not statistically significant. Meanwhile, as predicted in each hypothesis, two statistically significant independent variables have positive relationships with the dependent variable. The unstandardized coefficient of the collaborative governance independent variable is

5.912, which describes that an increase of one unit for the collaborative governance independent variable results in an expected increase in 5.912 of the dependent variable (variation of charter school service delivery of each school district) with other independent variables held constant. On the other hand, the unstandardized coefficient of the fiscal capacity independent variable is 0.73, which means that an increase of one unit for the fiscal capacity independent variable results in an expected increase in 0.0073 of the dependent variable with other independent variables held constant.

These final results address that the potential logic of the first and second hypothesis are right. That is to say, these results prove two hypotheses: 1) school districts that have strong collaborative governance with the other public education organizations are more likely to deliver charter school services to their residents. 2) school districts with strong fiscal capacity are more likely to deliver charter school services to their residents. Meanwhile, the standardized coefficients of two statistically significant independent variables point out that the fiscal capacity independent variable has the strongest explanatory power in explaining the dependent variable by showing that the value of its standardized coefficient is larger than the value of the standardized coefficient of the collaborative governance independent variable.

〈Table 4〉 Determinants for Dependent Variable

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	S.E.	Beta		
Collaborative governance*	5.912	3.506	0.164	1.686	0.095
Fiscal capacity***	0.730	0.251	0.605	2.905	0.004
Residents' educational level	-0.004	0.017	-0.024	-0.204	0.839
Residents' economic level	-0.325	0.780	-0.048	-0.417	0.677
Pro-SCM interest groups	0.122	0.098	0.101	1.252	0.213
Minority population	-0.037	0.182	-0.040	-0.202	0.840
Constant	-4.857	7.848		-0.619	0.537
N	110				
F-statistic (6, 104)***	15.904				
Adjusted R-square	0.448				

Note: D.V.: Variation of charter school service delivery of each school district

*** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; * significant at .10 level

V. Conclusions and Implications

Public administration scholars usually explain the term governance with two styles—single governance and collaborative governance. As Ansell and Gash (2008) define, single governance is a governance style that a single government works alone in adopting a new public service and delivering it to its demanders while collaborative governance is a governance style driving multiple stakeholders such as governments, private companies, citizens, etc. to work together in completing government actions like public service adoption and delivery. These days, many scholars have proved that the collaborative governance style is better than the single governance style in adopting a new public service and delivering it to citizens. However, the literature review discovered that there are a lack of studies analyzing collaborative governance's role in the case of the local charter school service delivery. This academic lack in the charter school service delivery area has led the author to examine the relationship between collaborative governance and charter school service delivery. Selecting Colorado's school districts as the units of analysis, this study primarily explores if collaborative governance, which is measured by network density, positively influences in facilitating a school district to deliver charter school services to its residents. Finally, this study confirms that collaborative governance is a main factor in explaining the mechanisms of the local charter school service delivery case. On the other hand, this study contributes to Korean market-oriented government reform growth because this study has introduced the in-depth contents of the school choice movement and charter schools of SCM's representative tool to the Korean public administration area, which has only been used to theoretical contents such as strategies and tactics that Osborne and Gaebler (1992) have proposed through their book.

This study demonstrates that a school district more strongly conducting collaborative governance with other public education organizations delivers more charter school services to its residents. This might be because a school district obtains more information and stronger trust for a charter school from other public

education organizations consisting of collaborative governance. Both information and trust play a role as a main factor reducing transaction costs, which occur in when a school district adopts and delivers a charter school to its own education customers. That is to say, we can conclude that a school district that wants to provide its residents with more charter school services needs to pursue collaborative governance working together with other public education organizations having the same purpose supporting charter schools.

The other statistical findings indicate that the fiscal capacity independent variable is statistically significant in explaining the variation of the local charter school service delivery. Based on the literature review, the hypothesis of this fiscal capacity independent variable shows that there are possibilities having both positive and negative relationships with the dependent variable. This final analyzed result supports that in the case of Colorado school districts, the strong fiscal capacity of each school district leads a school district to deliver more charter school services to its residents than the weak fiscal capacity of each school district does. This means that better fiscal capacity of a school district makes a school district deliver more charter school services to its residents. That is to say, this result implies that the strong fiscal capacity of a school district is a main factor leading a school district to adopt and conduct more innovative education tools. Thus, this empirical evidence proves that Mintrom and Vergari's study, which demonstrates that a fiscal capacity of jurisdictions at the state level is a critical factor in explaining mechanisms of charter school service delivery, works for school districts at the local level as well.

Regarding future studies, this study needs to consider expanding the current scope of collaborative governance to all-encompassing collaborative governance including interest groups as well as individuals. The current study just analyzed collaborative governance among each school district and seven public education organizations. Thus, it is good for future studies to include all of educational actors—interest groups, private organizations, or individuals—at all levels in analyzing an explanatory role of collaborative governance. In the same vein, it will be an academic contribution if future studies examine the explanatory role of internal

(intra) collaborative governance, which is made with other actors such as private companies in a school district, on the variation of the local charter school service delivery. Moreover, future studies can contribute in seeking more accurate answers for an explanatory role of the current external collaborative governance by adding other Colorado's school districts as actors of the current external (inter) collaborative governance formed by seven public education organizations.

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국문초록 및 주제어

자율형공립학교서비스 전달에 대한 협력적 거버넌스의 설명력

이정호

대전대학교

자율형공립학교(Charter Schools)는 미국 공교육 개혁의 길잡이 역할을 하고 있는 학교선택운동(School Choice Movement)의 주요 기제 중에 하나이다. 1990년대 이후 지방정부인 교육구(school districts)가 자율형공립학교서비스를 지역주민들에게 적극적으로 제공해 함에 따라 현재는 자율형공립학교서비스 공급에 있어서 교육구 간 양적 차이가 커지고 있다. 본 논문은 이러한 현상이 왜 일어났는지를 협력적 거버넌스의 내용과 교육구의 5가지 성격적 요소를 활용하여 분석하고 있다. 저자는 본 연구주제를 실증적으로 분석하기 위해서 콜로라도 교육구를 표본으로 하는 데이터 셋(data set)을 만들었다. 이 계량적 자료를 분석한 최종통계분석결과는 타 기관과 협력적 거버넌스를 강하게 구축하고 있는 교육구와 좋은 재정적 역량을 갖고 있는 교육구일수록 지역주민들에게 더 많은 자율형공립학교서비스를 제공해 준다는 사실을 검증하고 있다.

[주제어: 협력적 거버넌스, 교육구의 재정능력, 공교육서비스]