

연구논문

Legitimacy as Resource: How Did the Presidential Impeachment in South Korea Succeed?*

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〈 Abstract 〉

This study retrospectively examines how the South Korean government tackled the “2016 Candlelight Protest” which ended with the impeachment of the then-President Park Geun-hye. To understand the rally’s impact on impeachment decision, we trace strategies of the Blue House and a civil organization named “Park Geun-hye Resignation Nationwide Movement.” Resource dependence theory has been adopted to explain the shift from one stage to another, in a sequence of four critical turning points of the process: 1) the outset of the scandal, 2) the third candlelight protest rally, 3) impeachment vote, and 4) the verdict of the Constitutional Court. The key finding is that when two conflicting forces collide multiple times in different stages, their chosen strategies in accumulation determine the end resulting equilibrium point. “Compliance” and “management” strategies, which are more extreme ways for an organization to cope with the state of affairs, work more effectively than “avoidance” strategy.

[Key words: Candlelight Protest, Resource Dependence Theory,
Presidential Impeachment]

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I . Introduction

This article attempts to retrospectively analyze the recent success of the Candlelight Protest Rally in South Korea. Impeaching the president was an unbelievable event in South Korea in terms of the prolonged legacy of military government 1961-1987. Even after the democratization, the Presidency had been criticized for centralizing all power to itself, resulting in the position earning a notorious nickname, “imperial presidency” (Roh, 2010: 271). How could the President be removed from her position despite her heavily institutionalized and unchallengeable power? Alternatively, how could the unorganized people be gathered and be continued to demonstrate despite the President’s desire to stay?

This paper adopts the resource dependence theory (RDT) to reveal the forces behind the progress of Korean civilians’ confrontation with the then-President Park. The core resource for both the Presidents and the organizers of the rally is the legitimacy. The political process is about gaining general support from the citizens. Administration, as an organization in dispute with non-governmental organizations, such as nonprofits, is not often studied. The immense Candlelight Protest Rally that took place in Korea from 2016 to 2017 symbolizes a group of citizens that overthrew a government that had lost its legitimacy entirely. Surprisingly, numerous nonprofits cooperated to form a coalition under the name “Park Geun-hye Resignation National Movement (PRNM),”¹⁾ which was made up of more than 1,500 civic organizations (Kang, 2019). PRNM was not a simple “street protest” (Kim, 2017). It had thoroughly organized the entire process of candlelight vigils and devised strategies resulting from the intense debates within the organization.

Interestingly, the impeachment was not the most radical option in the first place. In fact, in November 2016, when the candlelight vigil was at its peak, impeachment

1) The organization is called by various names: “Emergency Citizen Action for the Park Geun-hye Administration’s Resignation” (ECAPAR) (Turner and Kwon & O’Donnell, 2018), “Emergency Nationwide Action for the Resignation of Park Geun-Hye” (Kang, 2019), “The Park Geun-Hye Impeachment Headquarters” (Shin, 2019) etc.

was not considered an option for most civilians (Lee, 2018; Choi & Choi, 2018, Jung et al., 2018). After several rallies by over a million participants, impeachment began to be considered an option worthy of notice because the major actors changed their strategies. However, explanations for impeachment as equilibrium has been limited. We aim to solve this question by employing qualitative methods. We predominantly rely on secondary sources however, also use two personal communication sources from PRNM executives, which were later published online by the PRNM Record Committee. Despite lacking available data, it would have been more persuasive if we could apply a complementary quantitative method to measure organizational legitimacy. The approval rating for Park and the number of participants in the rallies were almost pointless, each due to the variance and the accuracy dispute. Additionally, discussing organizational strategies might not be persuasive to some who voluntarily joined the rally, ignorant of the existence of a leading organization. Yet, our study is more in accordance with many previous studies that tried to understand the 2016 Candlelight Protest Rally by characteristics of tactics that supported mobilizing the mass (Suh, 2018, Chang, 2018) than giving another conspiracy theory of manipulative power. We will proceed with our analysis in the following two steps: first, discuss the basic ideas of RDT, main strategies within the theory, and organizational legitimacy as a resource. Second, examine the background and dynamics of the process, focusing on the strategies of PRNM and Park Guen-hye administration.

II. Theoretical Background and Framework

1. Resource Dependence Theory and Organizational Legitimacy

Interorganizational relationships' advantages and disadvantages have been of interest in several theories like transaction cost economics, resource dependence theory (RDT), strategic choice, stakeholder theory, organizational learning, and

institutional theory (Barringer & Harrison, 2000). Among those theories, RDT is rooted in an open system framework that involves organizations coming together to secure resources critical to their survival and growth (Pfeffer & Leong, 1977; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978: 175). RDT argues five core assumptions to explain organizations' behaviors, boundaries, resources as constraints, autonomy to manage uncertainty, the external, and internal strategies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978: 2003). Organizations as a coalition of interest set their boundaries to distinguish themselves from environment. They use resources which are always limited therefore function as constraints, while trying to reduce uncertainty with autonomy that can be gained by abundant resource flow from the environment. In dealing with uncertainty, whether organizations can survive and grow depends on how wisely they can use external and internal strategies. Organizations, as open systems, necessarily transact with other organizations in their environment, and these transactions inevitably create power-dependence relationships. Resources include social legitimacy, financing, the inputs necessary for production and services offered.

Of those resources, organizational legitimacy is a critical concept in the RDT (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978: 175), where the organization's goals and activities are ensured when they are approved and supported by the environment. Suchman (1995: 572) defines legitimacy as "a generalized perception or assumption that an entity's actions are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions." To say, legitimation is the process whereby an organization justifies to a peer or superordinate system its right to exist (Maurer, 1971). Suchman (1995) distinguishes strategic and institutional approaches; in the former, organization seeks its legitimacy voluntarily and manages it to garner social support (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975), in the latter, organizational legitimacy is formed through acknowledgment by external actors so as to exist beyond the focal organization's capacity (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Institutional theories (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991) have stressed that dynamics between the organization and environment not only stem from material imperatives but also from cultural norms, symbols, beliefs and rituals. RDT sees legitimacy in a strategic way;

external validation can be gained by effective executives who employ political frame as part of a more complex frame perspective to work “entrepreneurially” (Heimovics et al., 1993).

Despite the popularity of seeking strategies for the survival of nonprofits with the application of RDT, organizational legitimacy as resource was only partially discussed (Saidel, 1991, Verbruggen et al., 2011: 7). The institutional approach has mainly been the way nonprofit researchers deal with organizational legitimacy (Lister, 2003, Lehr-Lehnardt, 2005). Saidel (1991), in her study of exploring relationship between public sector agencies and nonprofit service providers in New York city, reasoned resource dependence equations with legitimacy as part of it. Lister (2003) saw legitimacy of NGOs within institutional theory, mainly following Scott’s (1995) classification of three legitimacies, which are regulatory, cognitive, and normative. Nonprofits’ legitimacy has been considered with accountability (Saxby, 1996, Boonyabancha, 2014) and representativeness (Pearce, 1997). Incorporating legitimacy as a resource and into the RDT theory seems fair as nonprofits function and forge relationships with other actors in the public arena. Moreover, legitimacy can be a critical resource when nonprofits and the government compete to survive in a revolutionary era.

2. Three Types of Strategies: Compliance, Avoidance, and Management

We will determine the proper strategies in the context of autonomy, uncertainty, and dependence, which are the basic concepts from RDT. Scholars have suggested various criteria for RDT strategies such as active adaptation (Nienhüser, 2008), constraint (Davis & Cobb, 2010), strategic restructuring (Kohm et al., 2000), resource obtainment (Malatesta & Smith, 2014), market orientation (Macedo & Pinho, 2006), advocacy and engagement (Suárez, 2009), to name a few. We try to classify strategies of RDT with “activeness” as crucial criteria, because the concept effectively reflects core mechanism of RDT, that why organizations form interrelationships to exert power or control over organizations that possess scarce resources. Activeness

signifies organizations having more autonomy; this does not necessarily mean having less uncertainty because leveraging influence to reduce uncertainty can be made with varying degrees of autonomy. For managing interdependency, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978; 2003) stated the following strategies: adapting in the sense of organizational compliance, avoiding influence from the environment, managing and avoiding dependence, and managing the social conditions. We follow Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) with a little adjustment; we combined the third and fourth categories of their classification as shown in Table 1.

〈Table 1〉 Classification of Strategies based on RDT

Pfeffer and Salansik (1978)	This Article	The Degree of Activeness
Organizational compliance	Compliance: fully complying with the environment	Low
Avoiding influence from the environment: eg., creation of illusion that the demand has already been met	Avoidance: Avoiding influence as an organizational response	Medium
Managing and avoiding dependence: eg., creation of alternative resources	Management: Taking management of social condition and dependence on others	High
Managing the conditions of social control		

We define “fully complying with the environment” as the least active strategy for organizations. Compliance signifies “loss of discretion, a constraint, and an admission of limited autonomy” (Pfeffer, 2003: 663). Compliance as a strategy is not discussed much since this may lead to additional inter-organizational influence attempts. That is, from the perspective of traditional RDT, by complying with the environment, an organization may achieve its goal in the short term, however, organizational autonomy is likely damaged in the long term (Nienhüser, 2008: 26). Verbruggen et al. (2011) determined global nonprofits’ financial transparency with a perspective of RDT and coercive isomorphism, measuring compliance to see dependence.

Next, “Avoiding influence as an organizational response” is the next non-active strategy (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). In this category, using the mechanism of sequential attention for different environmental needs (Cyert & March, 1963), nondisclosure of each group’s actual achievement, playing one group off against another explicitly, can be included (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Avoidance of influence should be distinguished from strategies for avoiding resource dependence and avoiding control. Organizations can actively safeguard themselves against possible instability or develop sustainable diversification of services to avoid resource dependence.

Lastly, we consider “Taking management of social condition and dependence on others” as the most active strategy. It is distinguished from others because organizations try to operate on the environment rather than respond to demands. Thus, organizations attempt to change the environment, not vice versa. Management of social condition comprises control of demands, the definition of satisfaction, formation of demands, factors affecting discretion in behavior, and visibility of behaviors and outcomes. Conversely, managing and avoiding dependence comprises organizational changes, such as structural reform, the evolution of information systems, diversification, absorption of the environment, and lobbying.

This classification and the relevant concepts will be used to explain the four impeachment stages of President Park Geun Hye as well as the strategy utilized by PRNM vs. the Blue House.

3. Why RDT in South Korea Candlelight Rally?

Our attempt to apply RDT to the Candlelight Protest might seem challenging to social movement theorists. Resource mobilization theory (RMT), grievances theory, political opportunity structure theory, and social network theory have been more standard mechanisms to identify the motivation for collective actions. In case of the South Korea Candlelight Protest, many have considered grievance as a critical factor that brought so many unaffiliated citizens together so quickly (Yun & Min, 2020,

Kang, 2019, Lee, 2018). RMT, despite its popularity in the 1970s, has been criticized for failing to explain social movement communities with large network of individuals as well as such communities' success with a limited resource (Buechler, 1993). However, we disagree that grievance combined with the perception of social injustice had played the most powerful and the only role to bring citizens to the streets. Impeachment as an equilibrium question cannot be solved if it were the most proper explanation; citizens chanted for resignation initially however, changed the phrase at a certain point. Yet, it is also hard to follow RMT and assume that PRNM managed the whole situation because it was a form of an alliance comprising more than 1,500 nonprofits. According to RMT, the preexisting organization is critical in facilitating mobilization and it usually has formal, bureaucratic, centralized structures (Jenkins, 1983; Buechler, 1993). We attempt to discuss PRNM's strategies, spanning from organized mobilization to promoting voluntary involvement, as a recently developed successful social movement tactic. Explaining PRNM's strategy from the perspective of the RDT theory allows for a demonstration of the dynamics of resource acquisition between two forces when the liquidity of key resources is guaranteed. However, the RDT theory can be criticized for turning a blind eye to the philosophical enhancement of political legitimacy, unlike the existing RMT and other civil protest theories. Consequently, we introduce a relatively new theoretical perspective that covers the unique characteristic of the protest and aligns those effective strategies.

Alternatively, questions have arisen regarding the extent to which a firm's behavior, mostly aiming at maximizing its profit, can be empirically understood with RDT, which is based on limited rationality and distribution of power in relationships between organization and environment (Hilman et al., 2009; Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005: 169). For instance, RDT highlights action in response to the environment, seeing uncertainty as an outcome of the power-dependence dynamics, while private firms would consider different governance at a given uncertainty from the perspective of transaction theory (Williamson, 1985). In contrast, public organizations are more focused on managerial actions that can attract external political interests.

Although most studies preconditioned the government as having the power and monetary resources that organizations need or lack (Saidel, 1991; Heimovics et al., 1993; Guo & Acar, 2005; Im, 1997, 2015), we try to expand the theory to reversed relationship. During normal times, nonprofits' dependence on government creates uncertainty and vulnerability so that managers pursue maximizing autonomy by minimizing dependence on the government. However, when political tension severely arises, two players might seek optimal strategy to leverage influence by controlling resources that others need. In accordance with Fredrickson's (2015) argument, that a theory is best used as a guideline for sorting and interpreting individual facts in order, we apply RDT to facilitate our understanding of the 2016-17 Candlelight Rally, specifically how a peaceful overturning of consolidated democratic government was possible through an institutional mechanism. In the next chapter, we will analyze the Korean government and nonprofits' strategies to obtain organizational legitimacy from citizens with three strategic distinctions in the background, which are compliance, avoidance and management.

III. The Overall Process of the Case

1. Four Critical Phases

The Candlelight Protest lasted 183 days from its first protest on October 29th, 2016, to its twenty-third protest on April 29th, 2017, in which about seventeen million people participated (Suh, 2018; Shin, 2019: 126). Following previous studies' tradition of narratively illustrating the Candlelight rallies with critical events as junctures (Choi & Choi, 2018; Vegabooks, 2017; Kim, 2017), we also divide the whole process into four important phases accompanied by major strategic changes: the outset of scandal, the third Candlelight rally, impeachment vote, and the verdict of the Constitutional Court.

1) The Outset of Scandal (October 24th – November 11th, 2016)

On October 24th in 2016, JTBC, a Korean broadcasting company characterized by its sharp criticism and high credibility, announced that they found a tablet computer that once belonged to Choi Soon-sil. It was believed to contain critical information that reveals Choi's abuse of power: demanding millions of dollars from Samsung to use for her daughter, exerting inappropriate influence on political affairs including Presidential speeches, and pressurizing to make a huge donation to Mir Foundation and K-Sports, which are the nonprofit organizations that were founded by herself. Choi's power was attained directly through President Park since she was Park's one and only confidante.

Immediately after the "Tablet PC Report" on JTBC, there was a sporadic gathering at Cheonggye Plaza and other places on weekdays. On 25th, the approval rating of the president plummeted to 17.5% from 25% of last week (Gallup, 2016). On 26th, the Democratic Party claimed a special investigation on the "Choi Sun-sil Scandal," and the ruling party accepted it. Choi was arrested on November 3rd, and on November 5th, two hundred thousand citizens gathered in Gwanghwamun Square in Seoul; as shown in Figure 1, the approval rating of Park fell to 4%, by both major polling companies (Korean Gallup, 2016; Realmeter, 2016).

2) The Third Candlelight Rally (November 12th – 25th, 2016)

On November 12th, more than one million citizens came together chanting "Park Guen-hye out!" This number was unprecedented except for South Korea's June Struggle of 1987, which brought democracy to the country. Figure 1 shows estimated number of protestors by the police (the blue line) and nonprofits (the orange line). Various civic organizations and celebrities made rally speeches. From this moment onward, many foreign newspapers started to deliver the phenomenal scenes of protesting with a tone of surprise.

3) Impeachment Vote (November 26th – December 9th, 2016)

On November 26th and on December 3rd, nearly two million people came out on the streets. Major politicians in the ruling party started discussing impeachment in the last week of November and reluctantly acceded to an impeachment vote in the first week of December. A bill to impeach Park was passed by 234 votes to 56 in the national assembly on December 9th.


4) The Verdict of Constitutional Court (December 10th, 2016 – March 10th, 2017)

After the suspension of Park's presidential power by impeachment vote by the National Assembly, three months passed until the Constitutional Court confirmed her impeachment. Meanwhile, the Constitutional Court had seventeen hearings, and an independent counsel inquiry uncovered a series of corruption, including multi-million donations from Korean conglomerates, forced by Choi Soon-sil. Pro-park protests thronged the streets as well, together with the American and Korean flags in their hands. The Constitutional Court unanimously upheld the decision by the Parliament to impeach Park over alleged corruption on March 10th.

〈Table 2〉 Four Critical Phases of 2016–17 Candlelight Protest

1	10/24/2016 – 11/11/2016	The Outset of Scandal "Tablet PC Report" by JTBC Approval rating of Park Guen-hye fell to 4%
2	11/12/2016 – 11/25/2016	The Third Candlelight Rally More than one million demonstrators nationwide
3	11/26/2016 – 12/9/2016	Impeachment Vote A bill to impeach Park passed by 234 votes to 56
4	12/10/2016 – 3/10/2017	The Verdict of Constitutional Court Seventeen hearing Impeachment unanimously decided

〈Figure 1〉 President Park’s Approval Ratings and Estimated Number of Protestors



2. Four Possible Scenarios

The possible scenarios in such unprecedented situation can be summarized down to four. The first option was the “status quo and normalization” that the Blue House wanted. The incumbent politically appointed public officials and the local political leaders in the ruling party expected the situation to diffuse and recover to status quo. Considering that many presidents in South Korea had suffered from low approval ratings and candlelight vigils during their terms of office, this alternative seemed plausible in the initial phase. For instance, the 2008 candlelight protest lasted over one hundred days with at least eighty thousand protestors,²⁾ starting from the expression of the opposition to the Free Trade Agreement with United States however, gradually expanding to political issues including education, and privatization of government agencies. The protest in 2008 also asked for the resignation of the then-President Lee Myung-bak, however, he completed his term of office by apologizing to the public and arresting the suspected nonprofit members organizing the protests.

The second option was stepping down of Park, leaving public affairs to the Prime Minister, who would have been newly appointed concerning the National Assembly’s interests. This option was preferred by both political parties because they were unprepared for the Presidential elections. The ruling Republican Party had

2) The number 80,000 was estimated by the police on June 10th 2008 protest; the nonprofits estimated the number as 700,000.

ambivalent feelings about this option; it was afraid of losing the election aftermath of stepping down of President Park, however, simultaneously, it was relieved by the fact that the opposition Democratic Party had also not aligned both formal and informal organizations within the party, leaving the potential candidates confused and unprepared. Conversely, the Democratic Party was positive to the option with confidence stemming from the President's extremely low approval rating. That is, with uncertainty, both parties saw the potential shots to win.

The third option was the impeachment of Park, which was not a desirable option for both parties. The Republican Party did not prefer this option because it would appear more like a victory of the opposition party compared to the second alternative of stepping down of Park. It was worried because this could lead to a chain reaction of losing upcoming local elections (2018) and general elections (2020). The Democratic Party was also worried about the risk of losing the impeachment vote, since the Constitutional Court committee members were known to be politically inclined to the then-President Park. Moreover, the Democratic Party had attempted Presidential impeachment in 2006, targeting President Roh, which brought a huge backlash from its supporters. Subsequently, Presidential impeachment had been treated as one of the never-to-take-option within the party. However, the impeachment option became the final equilibrium. The situation concluded to this option weighs heavily on the role of PRNM, which we will discuss in the following chapter.

The fourth option was the immediate resignation of the President. In South Korean history, three Presidents had resigned themselves, of which, two were facing military Coup d'etat, and one was the case of the former President Rhee Seung-man in the April 19th Revolution of 1960, responding to citizens' demands. Therefore, it seems natural that citizens first chanted for resignation on account of path dependence. Alternatively, it was the least preferred option for Park administration and the ruling party. Immediate resignation would bring the complete re-organization of the current administration while the second option, stepping down of Park, would extend the life of the administration in the form of a coalition government. The third option, the impeachment of Park, even though the outcome would be the worst for

Park administration since it does not guarantee afterward courtesy to former President if accepted, at least had a possibility to win back the Blue House, depending on the verdict of the Constitutional Court. However, the resignation meant the end of the Park Geun-hye administration.

〈Figure 2〉 Four Possible Scenarios



IV. Analysis: from the Standpoint of PRNM and The Blue House

1. PRNM


1) The Outset of Scandal: Alliance

An alliance involves agreements between two or more organizations to pursue joint objectives by coordinating activities or sharing knowledge or resources (Scott & Davis, 2007). Whether the strategy is effective, has been intensively discussed in RDT, while other theories discuss more on inter-organizational relationships (Barringer & Harrison, 2000). An alliance is the next constraining choice to joining an association (Davis & Cobb, 2010), mergers, and co-optations (Malatesta & Smith, 2014). It can function as a strategic restructuring that includes a commitment to continue for the foreseeable future (Kohm et al., 2000). However, some argue that alliance can be less effective for nonprofits that otherwise potentially merged (Dress & Heugens, 2013). Many Struggling nonprofits consider merging to reduce competition for funding, yet the short-term and long-term consequences of these strategies are not always clear. By alliance, which is one of the new patterns of nonprofits bringing themselves together (Maletesta & Smith, 2014), organizations can reduce uncertainty and dependency without any change to their organizational structure.

In phase one, at the outset of the scandal, South Korean nonprofits allied for joint action. PRNM was established on November 3rd to organize the second Candlelight Rally and officially was found on November 9th. More than 1,500 nonprofits joined PRNM initially, which steadily grew as time passed (Shin, 2019: 126). PRNM was open to any nonprofits, unlike the previous organizing committees of large-scale protests in South Korea. Especially numerous nonprofits from local areas, most of which were newly established in 1990 (Kim & Moon, 2003), participated in this committee to an unprecedented extent.

For the organizational structure of PRNM, it had a representative conference and two steering committees, which were standing steering committee and working-level meetings (PRNM Record Committee, 2020). After a couple of protests, PRNM realized that their two-level steering committees were not efficient. As shown in Figure 3, on Tuesdays, a standing steering committee, of which 25 were arranged by leading nonprofits, was held. With the output from the Tuesday meetings, 7-80 nonprofits arranged a working-level steering committee on Wednesdays. The Tuesday meetings became non-regular after the third Candlelight protest rally for both efficiency and democracy of PRNM.

〈Figure 3〉 The Organizational Structure of PRNM



By drawing almost all the nonprofits in South Korea, they all had equal opportunity to represent themselves and make organizational structure horizontal. It was one of the reasons why PRNM could gain legitimacy from citizens. Guo and Acar (2005) analyzed the nonprofits' tendency to unite to receive better support from the environment. South Korean Candlelight vigils demonstrated nonprofits' solidarity in terms of legitimacy. Additionally, in the organization's power relations, PRNM absorbed diverse organizations, such as labor unions, cultural associations, and civic groups, thereby differentiating organizational structure and diversifying activities (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Therefore, the strategy of alliance can be identified as the management of the environment.

2) The Third Candlelight Rally: Non-violence and Hedging

Candlelight Protest in 2016 was different from those of 2002 and 2008 in terms of violence. In past experiences, although candlelight protests started with peaceful solidarity among the participants, occasional violent images of clashes between protesters and the police were in the press. It was in the second phase that the non-violence strategy was solidified. Non-violence as civil disobedience has been a popular strategy in modern demonstrations such as the Occupying Wall-street movement. It has more power to gather people together and leads to continuous attention to democracy afterward. Non-violent resistance techniques have been proven to be more effective than violent ones (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011) and can shape for mobilization and alliances, alternative social systems, removal of support from the existing system (Vinhagen, 2006). On the night of the third Candlelight Rally that drew over one million participants, a few critical moments could have been violent. In the 2008 Candlelight Protest, some college students took shields from police during the confrontation and climbed up the roofs of police buses, which led to violence (Hwang & Willis, 2020). However, many citizens proactively had been warning of possible violence and trying to keep people out of the site when there is impending violence. Moreover, some citizens attached flower-shaped

stickers on police buses (Park, 2017).

Non-violence was an intended strategy decided after intense debate (Choi & Choi, 2018). Noted, "People's Uprising Struggle Headquarters (PUSH)," to which many committee members of PRNM belonged to, used to be marked with violence. The leader of PUSH, Han Sang-gyun, was once arrested and sentenced to prison, being accused of leading violent protests (Choe, 2015). Moreover, a farmer was blasted by police water cannon in a protest that was led by PUSH who passed away after ten months of unconsciousness (Choe, 2015). When PUSH became a temporal organization to arrange the first Candlelight rally, certain concerns arose with regard to possible violence. It is noted that PRNM committee members from PUSH changed their stance from "inevitable violence could occur during the protest" to "unconditional non-violence," which was in contrast to their previous uncompromising attitude. It was to avoid possible accusations from citizens afterward. PRNM carefully planned the route for protest that would minimize the possibility of physical confrontation (PRNM Record Committee, 2020).

Hedging was employed as a successful strategy in establishing a strategic relationship with the National Assembly. To maintain the legitimacy gained in the first phase, PRNM avoided political parties. Except for Lee Jae-myung, the then-governor-elect of Gyeonggi and the Democratic Party's Presidential candidate in 2022, who made an impromptu speech in the second rally, it never allowed politicians to stand on the stage (PRNM Record Committee, 2020). Although the rate of participants supporting an opposition party was far higher than that of the participants supporting the ruling party, one cannot assert that the candlelight rallies were a political attack led by the opposition party (Lee, 2018). Avoiding political parties was a profitable strategy for two reasons. First, it prevented PRNM from being seen as pursuing their own interest instead of the public good. Second, it raised the autonomy of PRNM by reducing dependency on political parties. When nonprofits' political advocacy is analyzed from the perspective of RDT, nonprofits dependent on government funding tend to follow government policies (Lerous & Goerdel, 2009) because implicit expectations prevent nonprofits from claiming radical agendas (Dowie, 1996). It could apply to PRNM's situation as well, that owing to nonprofits'

legitimacy dependence in the context of representation and mobilization on behalf of citizens, it was better not to involve other actors that can absorb political resource. Political parties could have disturbed PRNM's agenda-setting to take advantage of upcoming elections and re-organization of administration.

3) The Impeachment vote: Change of Goal

Among the four possible scenarios, impeachment was not the most preferred alternative until phase three. Many activists did not appreciate the convergence to the impeachment scenario because they feared the center of public opinion shifting from the streets to the National Assembly (PRNM Record Committee, 2020). If not the “immediate resignation” by the popular struggle, then the ruling party will lead to important political negotiations (Choi & Choi, 2018: 156). It happened in the June Struggle of 1987 that took out the military regime. Roh Tae-woo, who won the first democratic election of South Korea aftermath, was a chosen successor of the previous military regime. Moreover, the Constitutional Court's composition was considered conservative (Choi & Choi, 2018: 162). That is why, from the beginning, the slogan was “resignation of Park Guen-hye.” The public did not prefer the impeachment as well; a public opinion poll, conducted on November 21st to 22nd, illustrated that 40.2% preferred Park's immediate resignation while 15.9% preferred the National Assembly's impeachment process (Kwak, 2016). Nevertheless, in phase three, when the uncertainty of impeachment significantly decreased because of agreement between both political parties and accusations of Park by the prosecution, PRNM changed their primary preference to impeachment (PRNM Record Committee, 2020).

4) The Verdict of Constitutional Court: Goal Clarification and a Requirement for the Environment

After the impeachment vote passed, slogans of Candlelight rallies became more specific. PRNM weekly held long-lasting meetings to decide on slogans (PRNM

Record Committee, 2020). Words like “Punish accomplice,” “Hwang Gyo-an³⁾ resign,” “February impeachment,” and “Special Prosecution Extension” were included in slogans. These slogans contrast to the previous ones, such as “Let us get together.” Organizational legitimacy can be gained and reinforced by generating goals acceptable by the relevant public (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003: 664). In phase four, citizens could accept more specified slogans because a series of rallies provided civic learning opportunities. Thus, clarification of goals is one way to manage the environment.

Additionally, in this phase, PRNM actively required support from the environment. The disappearance of the Presidential candidates in the January rallies dampened the citizens’ ability to crowd. It was to focus political power on the next Presidential election campaign, away from the political risks that could have come after consenting to the rally’s demands. Thus, it was a strategy of political parties that tried to reduce dependence to strengthen autonomy from street movement. The Justice Party, a social-democratic political party that had six seats in National Assembly, drew a line from the request of Hwang’s resignation, and Democratic delegates proposed “reform legislation,” excluding the major demands of the movement. At this time, PRNM criticized the political parties through slogans and speeches, saying, “The impeachment is more important than the Presidential election.” PRNM also warned that the delay strategy of the Blue House could seriously undermine the impeachment. They knew that both managing the needs of the environment well and extracting environmental resources is essential.

2. The Blue House

1) The Outset of Scandal: Sequential Attention and Power rebalance

In the first Presidential statement, Park propounded Constitutional Amendment

3) Hwang was the acting president after Park Geun-hye was impeached. He said that the entire turmoil was not Park’s fault but his failure to support her.

that the National Assembly had been contemplating for many years. Moreover, it was one of Park's Presidential pledges (Lee, 2012). The revision mainly focused on modifying a single Presidential term as five years, which for many years has been indicated as an imperfection of the current constitution, to consecutive terms. The Blue House chose to bring a new issue to overcome Choi's scandal by employing sequential attention (Cyert & March, 1963).

The Blue House's other strategy was power rebalance. On November 2nd, Park nominated Kim Byung-joon as the Prime Minister, letting him be approved by the National Assembly and several other people from Democratic Party as senior executives. It was an attempt to please the opposition Democratic Party. Kim, a former presidential advisor, was supposed to have support from the opposition party. With the nomination of Kim, the Blue House tried to avoid negative public opinion by pleasing the opposition party while hoping the ruling party did not oppose the National Assembly's approval process. However, the nomination of Kim was not approved and did not work effectively to calm down citizen's discontentment. Park failed to serve as a leader, lacking the ability to recognize the environment, therefore being unresponsive. The environment's demands were not a unilateral nomination of the prime minister, but a new cabinet through communication and consultation.

2) The Third Candlelight Rally: Offer Normalizing Accounts

Park Guen-hye refused to step down, which made rallies grow with each passing week as more Koreans became enraged (Ock, 2016). Park administration seemed to focus on its ongoing policies in phase two. There was policy progress in the General Security of Military Information Agreement and THAAD deployment. The Blue House ordered the prosecution to investigate the L-city scandal, which was considered to be connected to her predecessor, Lee Myung-bak. By this, the Blue House tried to warn the ruling party not to dare defy her office. It was expected that a considerable portion of the ruling party could be blamed for the L-city scandal. Offering

normalizing accounts is sometimes effective (Suchman, 1995); however, it was not the case for Park. Park took the strategy of avoiding external influence instead of confronting citizen's demands.

3) Impeachment Vote: Change of Goal

After several massive rallies, leading figures of both parties recognized that the removal of Park, either in the form of voluntary resignation or impeachment, was inevitable (Choi & Choi, 2017; BBC, 2017). More critically, the attitude of the prosecution changed. In the earlier candlelight vigil, the prosecution had demonstrated a favorable attitude toward the Park administration; for instance, it gave 36 hours to Choi after her return from Germany. However, on November 17th, after the Special Investigation Law was passed, and nearly one million citizens flocked to the fourth candlelight vigil, the investigation was strengthened, and Park was identified as a suspect.

When the asymmetric dependence of resources deepens, either uncertainty or autonomy is pursued (Bryer, 2009). In the third Presidential statement, On November 29th, Park offered to step down, announcing relinquishment of Presidential power to the National Assembly (Song, 2016). She said, "I will leave to parliament everything about my future, including shortening of my term." It was to yield autonomy to decrease uncertainty. Notably, both PRNM and Park Guen-hye made a change of goals in phase three. The Blue House, as in phase one, tried to gather support from the ruling party as an alternative resource to replace public support.

4) The Verdict of Constitutional Court: Delay, Deny, and Conspiracy

On January 1st, Park unexpectedly denied the cause of the impeachment by holding a briefing session at the New Year's Greetings press conference at the Blue House. The main content was that the National Assembly's impeachment vote was unfair, and she had no direct responsibility for the disaster of the Sewol ferry. The

Constitutional Court hastened the ruling by adopting media reports as evidence (Impeachment of the President (Park Geun-hye) 2017). The President's defense team adopted delay strategy by submitting the aged data and piling tons of witness applications (Yonhap News, 2017). Park never attended the seventeen hearings and only dispatched lawyers to read a prepared statement which denied allegations of corruption. Park's refusal to appear and to render her testimony delayed the trial process. When the crowd of candlelight vigils fell to 100,000 by early January, Park blamed the special prosecutor with Choi Soon-sil. Many thought that a conservative majority of justices, eight of whom were appointed by Park or her predecessor or nominated by the ruling party, would reach a verdict in favor of Park (Choi & Choi, 2017; Kim, 2017). That is why Park pushed back her trials as much as possible so that attention from outside could wane (Turner et al., 2018).

Park's other strategy in this phase was to bring conspiracy theories. In the "Jung Gyu-jae TV" interview on January 25th, President Park said, "this incident has been planned and managed long ago." She insisted that what is happening to her is plotted with "too many nonsensical factors." This was Park's attempt to change the public's mind before the New Year holidays. The conspiracy theories had an immediate effect and successfully made the supporters of Park Geun-hye gather together to open the Taegukgi rally on a larger scale (Yun & Min, 2020). The participants dubiously said they outnumbered candlelight protestors, however, the exact estimated numbers are not confirmed. Some of the supporters' attitude toward information was "confirmation bias." This strategy may fall into creating an alternative resource, which belongs to the management of dependence. The strategies and their belonging categories in RDT can be seen in Table 3.


〈Table 3〉 Strategies of the Blue House and PRNM

	The Blue House			PRNM		
	Strategies	Categories	Scenario	Strategies	Categories	Scenario
1	The outset of the scandal (October 24th– November 11th, 2016)	Sequential attention	Avoidance	Alliance	Management	Resignation
		Power rebalance				
2	The Third Candlelight rally (12 – 25 Nov. 2016)	Offer normalizing accounts	Avoidance	Non-violence	Compliance	
				Hedging	Management	
3	Impeachment vote (November 26th – December 9th, 2016)	Change of goal	Compliance	Change of goal	Compliance	
4	The verdict of the Constitutional Court (December 10th, 2016 – March 10th, 2017)	Delay and deny	Avoidance	Goal clarification	Management	Impeachment
		Interview to Say a Conspiracy	Management	A requirement for the environment	Management	

V. Discussion and Conclusion

We have reviewed The Blue House and South Korean nonprofits’ strategies for organizational survival in a power struggle. In the first phase, the Blue House made the situation worse by demonstrating cognitive incapability. While PRNM has taken a strategy to maximize organizational legitimacy by an alliance, institutional actors have taken a strategy to focus on power rebalancing among them. This reveals that the severity of the situation was accepted differently by these two actors. In terms of securing autonomy for the environment, PRNM actively formulated a representative committee, while the Blue House only promised “consultation with the National Assembly.”

〈Figure 4〉 The Change of Major Actors' Scenario Preference




In the second phase, the Blue House attempted to counterattack PRNM by offering normalizing accounts. However, by this time, the main actors had a different preferences for scenarios. The Blue House wanted to retain power, the opposition and ruling party wanted to win the next presidential election, and the PRNM wanted Park Geun-hye's unconditional resignation and a criminal trial. Among these different preferences, the Blue House tried to force its preferred scenario, status quo and normalization, however, failed.

The most critical phase was the third, because the main actors converged on the option of impeachment, except for the Blue House. Impeachment was not even the second-best alternative for Park. Since the treatment for the impeached former President is considerably limited due to Article six and seven of the Former Presidents Act in Korea, it would have been better for Park to resign in phase two. Until phase three, no party had been eager to impeach Park due to the previous political failure, since they had all experienced a failed impeachment of the former president Roh Moo-hyun and faced difficult consequences of it. The Prosecution and PRNM played a role in gathering citizens' support; therefore, both organizations could reduce the uncertainty of impeaching the president. The National Assembly now achieved motivation and power to discuss the impeachment in detail. It was the period when the asymmetry of the resources of citizen support was deepened. This

is because organizational legitimacy is fundamentally derived from the support of citizens.

In the fourth phase, the Blue House had the last chance to mitigate the asymmetry of resources. It was also a crisis period for PRNM because the number of participants in the rally dropped significantly, which could be solved by actively calling for support from President Park’s opposition party. In the last period, the confrontational situation was the most obvious in this stage. Both organizations used the most aggressive strategy to create the environment more positively than to conform to the demands of the environment.



Generally, a form of nonprofit or civil organization depends heavily on the government’s financial support and conveys public service. However, in this particular case, nonprofits were not dependent on government but forming a competitive composition; they competed to achieve organizational legitimacy as a critical resource. Therefore, we applied RDT in a way that the resource is no longer “the funding” from the government but “the legitimacy” from the citizen.

It should be assured that PRNM was an organization with strategies that influenced the protest process even though it did not claim to be a leader. Without the strong coalition of citizens into PRNM, twenty-three Candlelight rallies would not have been organized so ideally and peacefully. They successfully gained

organizational legitimacy. When the candlelight protest organization committee's news about suffering from its debt of over 90 thousand dollars went on air, citizens donated over 700 thousand dollars in a week. A year after the revolution, PRNM received the Human Rights Award Prize of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung on behalf of 17 million protestors. Of course, Park Geun Hye's impeachment is the result of an ongoing accumulation of complex factors, including the Sewol Ferry disaster, accumulated policy failures, power struggles with authority, various scandals, and the subsequent drop in public popularity. However, this study focused on the strategies used by the PRNM and the Blue House from 2016 to 2017 to obtain legitimacy. The lack of discussion on the political background before the candlelight vigils is one of the limitations of this study.

This study's two contributions are: 1) it examined the reversed relationship between government and nonprofits in terms of dependence when it comes to the revolutionary era, thus broadening the scope of RDT. Applying RDT to explain both organizations' strategies bridges the gap in previous organizational studies, which have focused more on internal policies for higher performance, in that they managed external constraints to gain organizational legitimacy. 2) It discovered possible strategies for nonprofits from the perspective of RDT. In contrast to Park's strategies, most of which fall into the category of avoidance, PRNM chose to comply or manage the environment. It is notable that, in a revolutionary era, organizational legitimacy can be gained by the most active or passive strategy, however, not the middle one.

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요약 및 주제어

민주적 정당성 자원이 대통령 탄핵에 미친 영향: 자원의존이론 관점

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이 연구는 2016년 촛불집회 과정에서 참여자 간의 어떤 전략적 행위가 최종적으로 대통령 탄핵으로 이끌었는지를 자원의존이론의 관점에서 탐구하였다. 촛불집회 과정의 중요한 전환점은 1) JTBC 태블릿 PC 단독 보도, 2) 제3차 촛불 집회, 3) 탄핵 소추안 가결, 4) 헌법재판소 탄핵 인용 판결 등 네 가지 시점이었다. 촛불집회의 시작 단계에서 가능했던 대안은 1) 현상 유지 및 정상화, 2) 질서 있는 퇴진, 3) 대통령 탄핵, 4) 즉시 퇴진 등 네 가지였다. 각 시점에서 선호 대안을 선택할 때, 박근혜 정부와 '박근혜정권퇴진비상국민행동'으로 대표되는 시민단체의 전략 유형은 자원의존이론에 따라 순응, 회피, 관리 등 세 가지로 분류되었다. 분석 결과, 정부와 시민단체가 경합성을 띠는 민주적 정당성 자원을 획득하기 위하여 대립할 때, 회피 전략보다 순응 혹은 관리 전략이 더 효과적으로 작동하였다. 본 연구는 자원의존이론을 확장하여 평시에 정부의 물질적 자원에 의존하는 시민단체가 위기 상황에서 민주적 정당성 자원을 중심으로 정부와 경합하는 관계를 형성할 수 있음을 보였다. 또한 집회 초반에 어떤 행위자도 선호하지 않았던 대통령 탄핵 대안으로의 수렴이 행위자 간 전략적 선택의 균형점이었음을 보였다.

[주제어: 촛불집회, 자원의존이론, 대통령탄핵]